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1 Introduction
Fiscal equalization is a redistribution device which serves to correct vertical
scal unbalances and to diminish horizontal inequity1 between regions. It also
works as an insurance (risk sharing)2 mechanism in decentralized countries.
The level of scal equalization determines the degree of solidarity between
regional governments. In this sense, an excessive level of redistribution would be
perceived as unfair, by the contributing regions, if they end up losing positions
in the nal (resource) ranking. In fact, the literature on income distribution
considers the reranking e¤ect due to progressive transfers as undesirable. More-
over, the Principle of Transfers, also known as the Pigou-Dalton condition (Sen,
1973), establishes that any small transfer from a relatively richer individual to
a relatively poorer individual which does not alter the order (ranking) in the
income distribution is inequality reducing. Notice, though, that the preserva-
tion of the original ranking is a necessary condition.3 Therefore, it seems quite
reasonable that the same Principle of Transfers should also be applied when
redistributing resources between regional governments in order to secure hori-
zontal equity (as dened in note 1). Furthermore, it is in the general interest
that the equalization device should be the result of the consensus of all the
parts involved since a situation perceived as unfair by any of them could lead
to political conict and instability.4
The objective of this paper is to analyse the political viability of equaliza-
tion rules using a model of conict in the spirit of Ray (2009), which o¤ers
a generalization of the particular case of conict games developed in Esteban
and Ray (1999) and explored in detail by Esteban and Ray (2008). Thus, we
analyze the circumstances under which one region would be inclined to initi-
ate political conict when equalization rules are perceived as unfair. Political
conict is analysed through a game where two regions seek to maximize their
payo¤s in a Nash framework. The population of each region is considered a
group of players with identical preferences. Thus, each region is a lobby group
whose residents make some contribution (e¤ort) to lobbying to try to impose
their regional preferences for equalization on the rest of the country. Political
conict is dened as the total amount of resources expended on lobbying.
In order to apply the standard model of conict, we assume that there exists
a vertical grant (S); coming from the Central Government (CG), which is to
be distributed between two regions indexed by 1 and 2. The distribution of the
grant S is organized in two phases. In the rst phase, the CG distributes a
1According to the Canadian Constitution Act, 1982, Section 36 (2); the purpose of equal-
ization is to ensure "that provincial governments have su¢ cient revenues to provide reasonably
comparable levels of public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation". This is the
denition of horizontal equity between subcentral government units (e.g., provinces, regions,
municipalities, etc.).
2See, e.g., Persson and Tabellini (1996).
3See, Lambert (2001) for more on this.
4For instance, we understand as political conict a situation where a coalition (central)
government loses the political support of a regional party in the Senate or in the Parliament
due to a disagreement on the existing equalization system.
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transfer of H < S in order to achieve full equalization of per capita standard
revenues.5 In the second phase, the CG distributes Q = S   H. We assume
that the criterion to distribute Q is not xed but is the result of a social agree-
ment. Thus, regions have di¤erent preferences regarding their favoured option.
Consequently, each region behaves as a lobby group, defending its best choice
in its negotiations with the CG.
We assume, as is customary in models of conict, that each region obtains
zero utility (benet) when its best alternative is not chosen. We thus consider
three di¤erent distribution principles for sharing Q between regions 1 and 2.
In the rst, we assume that every region receives a proportion of Q equal to
its population share, ni: This implies that full equalization of standard per
capita revenues is nally achieved. In the second principle, we deem that Q
goes in full to the less deserving6 region. Thus, after equalization, disparities
between regions diminish but are not fully cancelled out. This means that the
ranking of regions, in terms of standard per capita revenues, is kept constant
after equalization. This kind of equalization scheme is used in many countries:
two well documented examples are the systems in place in Canada and in the
German Länder (see, Boadway and Shand (2007), Werner (2008)).
Finally, under the third principle of distribution, we consider that Q goes
in full to the more deserving region. The result then, is an over-redistribution
in favour of the more deserving one which causes a reranking of regions. Thus,
after equalization, the more deserving region has more per capita revenues than
the initially less deserving region and, consequently, it is able to provide a
higher level of public goods and services. The situation derived from the third
distribution principle ts the Spanish case perfectly.7 It is worth noting that
the reranking e¤ect characteristic of the Spanish equalization system is quite an
exceptional case, although not unique:8 up to 2000 the German Länder were
living a situation in which excessive redistribution was also causing a reranking
e¤ect.9
5We use the term, standard revenues, to refer to those revenues obtained by regional
governments when exerting a standard scal e¤ort. The use of a standard scal e¤ort is
a common feature of equalization grants since it reduces the strategic decisions by regional
governments. Usually, the standard scal e¤ort is exogenously determined by the central
government, or is calculated as the average tax rate. For instance, in the Canadian equalization
system the average tax rate of the thirteen provinces is used as indicator of standard scal
e¤ort.
6We consider than one region is more deserving than the other. By this we mean than one
region (the more deserving ) needs a higher grant to provide the same level of public services
than the less deserving region making a similar standard scal e¤ort. One region might be
more deserving because its tax base is smaller but also because it has larger needs (larger
population, older population, more poverty, etc.) when providing public services.
7 In Spain the equalization device between regional governments has always been charac-
terized by progressive transfers that cause a reranking e¤ect. This (long-lasting) situation
has lead to the discontent of the relatively richer regions and, especially of Catalonia, which
has been the leader of the decentralization process. Finally, the Catalan government has
demanded a full revision of the nancing system (including the equalization scheme) in the
framework of the new Catalan Constitutional Law (2006).
8See, Boadway and Shah (2007), Shah (2007).
9The equalization law (Finanzausgleichsgesetz, 1993) was impugned before the Federal
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In the theoretical model, we assume that the solution under the peaceful
agreement is full equalization between regions, in other words, proportional
sharing of Q. Thus, we analyse the conditions under which regions would be
inclined to instigate political conict in a non cooperative frame. The timing
of the game is as follows. In the rst stage, individuals decide the resources
they will expend on regional lobbying. The total amount of resources spent in
each region determines the regions probability of imposing its preferences on
the rest of the country. Accordingly, each region decides whether to toe the line
or whether to show disagreement. If either region disagrees, each side receives
"conict payo¤s". Otherwise, they receive "peace payo¤s". We obtain that
the emergence of political conict depends on the degree of publicness of the
regional budget. When regional budgets are used to provide pure public goods,
proportional equalization is politically viable. However, no equalization rule is
immune to political conict when budgets are used to provide private goods,
or a linear combination of public and private goods, which is a more realistic
scenario.
Our analysis relates to three strands of the literature: social conict (Es-
teban and Ray, 1999, 2008, 2009; Esteban and Schneider, 2008), the viability
of political systems and social decision rules (Esteban and Ray, 2001a, 2001b,
2008), and rent-seeking and lobbying (Verdier and Ades, 1996; Mohtadi and
Roe, 1998; Rama and Tabellini, 1998; Esteban and Ray, 2006).
The paper is organized in four sections. Following this introduction, a stan-
dard model of conict is presented. Section 3 is focused on analyzing the im-
munity to conict of di¤erent equalization rules. Finally, section 4 concludes
o¤ering some reections about the political implications of the results obtained.
2 A model of political conict
Lets assume that the CG is due to implement a vertical equalization grant to
secure horizontal equity between regional governments. Accordingly, the stan-
dard equalization grant is dened proportional to regional needs and inversely
related to standard regional revenues. One of the main issues in setting grants
of this kind is to decide whether equalization should be total or partial. If
equalization is fully accomplished, then regional governments achieve standard
average revenues per unit of need and disparities are fully cancelled. In contrast,
if equalization is partial, grants are used to diminish disparities ensuring that
all regions manage to cover a certain level of public provision10 while leaving
relatively less deserving regions still better o¤ after the equalization takes place.
Constitutional Court (FCC) by the Länder of Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria and Hesse. As a
result, the degree of equalization was reducedm, moving to a partial equalization scheme, and
the reranking e¤ect was avoided. In other words, the reform signied moving from the third
to the second distribution principle mentioned above (Fenge and Weizsäcker, 2001).
10This level could be dened, for example, as some sort of corrected mean or as a percentage
of the mean. The equalization system of the Canadian provinces (see, Boadway, 2007; Vail-
lancourt, 1998) o¤ers an example of the rst possibility while the equalization system among
German Länder (Werner, 2008), is an example of the second.
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Regional preferences about the level of equalization need not be homoge-
neous. In fact, relatively more deserving regions are likely to defend more egal-
itarian systems while relatively less deserving regions will probably be happier
under partial equalization. Thus, it might be not straightforward to reach an
agreement on the desired level of equalization. Also, if the equalization rule
applied by the central government is not considered fair or good enough by one
of the regions a situation of political conict could emerge.
To simplify lets consider two regions, labeled 1 and 2, which di¤er in their
favored alternative for equalization, while they are indi¤erent to the preferences
of the other region. Each region is composed by Ni individuals with homo-
geneous preferences for equalization and linear utilities, with
2X
i=1
Ni = N total
population. Each region attempts to impose its own preferences for equalization
on the rest of the country through lobbying. Thus, we measure political conict
as the global amount of resources expended on lobbying.
Consider now that the vertical equalization grant o¤ered by the CG totals S
euros and that regional population is used as the indicator of regional needs.11
Moreover, lets assume that the CG distributes the amount S between region 1
and 2 in two steps in the following way. First, the CG distributes H euros to
fully equalize standard per capita revenues. And second, the CG distributes the
rest of the grant, Q = S H; between the two regions. There are three possible
rules for distributing the extra amount Q:
(a) Proportional share: each region receives a total amount equal to niQ,
where ni is the proportion of population in region i. After distributing
the total grant, S; standard per capita revenues are fully equalized between
regions.
(b) Q goes in full to region 1. In this way, the result is partial equalization
and the relatively less deserving region continues to be better o¤ after
equalization. In other words, the equalization system respects the original
regional ranking; regional disparities are reduced but not fully cancelled.
(c) Q goes in full to region 2. Consequently, there is over-redistribution and
reranking of regions. In other words, after equalization, the originally
more deserving region has higher per capita resources for providing public
services than the originally less deserving region.
Lets use the proportional rule of distribution (a) as a benchmark. In other
words, assume that the peaceful outcome is the result of applying the propor-
tional rule. Then the other two rules of distribution, (b) and (c); could be
conceived of as the outcomes of a lottery where the prize is Q. With probability
11A frequent indicator of regional needs is population, since it is very simple and easy
to compute. See, for example, the regional equalization systems of Canada and Germany
(Boadway, 2007; Werner, 2008). However, there exist more complex methods to estimate
regional needs taking into account, for instance, population age, poverty, etc. See, e.g., Boothe
and Vaillancourt (2007) and Shah (2007) for a thorough analysis and examples.
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p option (b) is implemented and region 1 obtains the prize Q: With probability
(1  p) option (c) is implemented and it is region 2 that obtains the prize Q.
The winning probability of each region depends on its lobbying e¤ort, i.e., on
the resources invested in lobbying. Thus, the probability of winning for region
i is dened as,12
pi =
niri
2X
j=1
njrj
(1)
where ni is the proportion of population in region i and ri are the resources
devoted to lobbying by each individual residing in region i, i = 1 and 2.
Social conict is dened as the total amount of resources spent on lobbying,
R =
2X
j=1
njrj . The cost of lobbying13 for each individual is expressed by the
isoelastic function
c(ri) =
1

ri ;  > 1 (2)
Where c0(ri) > 0 and c00(ri) > 0 and  is the cost elasticity.
Because the cost function is strictly convex every individual will expend
equal e¤ort (contribution) on lobbying. Furthermore, we will assume that there
is no free-riding.14
Formally, once a region has initiated conict, the objective of its political
leader is to maximize the regional per capita payo¤ as follows
Max: ui = pii   c(ri) (3)
ri
where pii is the expected benet of region i when its rst option is imposed
on the rest of the country, and c(ri) is the per capita cost of lobbying dened
in (2).
The F.O.C corresponding to regions 1 and 2 are dened respectively by
expressions (4)and (5) as follows
1n1n2 = R
2
 
r
 1
1
r2
!
(4)
2n2n1 = R
2
 
r
 1
2
r1
!
(5)
12Skaperdas (1996)
13We could think of it as the monetary and time resources expended on lobbying.
14To take into account within group free-riding, we should introduce in the model the notion
of e¤ ective relative size of the group allowing for rescaling. See Esteban and Ray (2001 a) for
an analysis of the free-rider problem in rent-seeking models.
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Dividing (4) by (5) and rearranging terms, we obtain the relative e¢ cacy of
lobbying by region 1 as
' =
r1
r2
=

1
2
 1

(6)
To fully dene the conict equilibrium solution we need to nd the associated
regional payo¤s. Then, taking for example region 1, from expression (4) we
dene,
r1 = 1p1p2 (7)
Now using (7) we can express the per capita payo¤ of region 1 as
u1 = p11   1

r1 = 1

p1   1

p1p2

(8)
Taking into account that p2 = (1  p1) and rewriting (8) we obtain
u1 = 1
 
kp1 + (1  k) p21

(9)
where k 2 (0; 1) since k =  1 ; (1  k) = 1 and  > 1.
Finally, combining equations (1) and (6) we can express the winning proba-
bility of region 1 as,
p1 =
n1'
n1'+ (1  n1) (10)
Thus equations (6) ; (9) and (10) dene the equilibrium solution under con-
ict corresponding to region 1. The equilibrium condition for region 2 is dened
in a similar fashion.
3 Equalization rules immune to conict
Regions will initiate conict when in doing so they expect to obtain a prot with
respect to the peaceful agreement. Considering that under peace every region
receives q = QN per inhabitant, region i would initiate conict if and only if
pii   c(ri) > q (11)
Condition (11) depends on the nature of i. We consider the extreme cases of
private and public regional budgets and the general case where regional budgets
are used to provide a mixture of pure public and private goods. In concrete
terms, we analyse the following scenarios:
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 Private regional budgets. By this we mean that regional budgets are
spent on providing rival public goods; in the extreme case we might think
of monetary transfers. Since public goods are rival, the utility derived
from them depends on population size.
 Public regional budgets. By this we mean that there is no congestion or
rivalry in the provision of public goods and therefore the derived utility is
independent of population size.
 Private and public regional budgets. This is the general case, where some
of the goods provided by regional governments are pure public goods and
others are rival public goods.
3.1 Private regional budgets
When regional budgets are used to provide private goods or rival public goods,
the per capita payo¤ of imposing regional preferences is dened by i =
q
ni
;
q = QN and i = 1; 2: Thus, using (9) and (11) the condition for region i initiating
conict is
q
ni
 
kpi + (1  k) p2i

> q (12)
where
pi =
nki
nki + (1  ni)k
(13)
and k 2 (0; 1) since k =  1 , (1  k) = 1 and  > 1.
Since
@pi
@ni
= k
(ni (1  ni))k 1
(1  ni)k + nki
2 > 0;
more populated regions have a higher probability of winning.
Proposition 1 Assume that regional budgets are used to provide private goods
(and rival public goods), and that under the peaceful agreement, regions have a
per capita equal share of Q. Thus, there exists a certain ni 2
 
0; 12

such that
regions with a population share ni  nwill be likely to instigate political conict
To prove this proposition see that, simplifying, condition (12) reduces to 
kpi + (1  k) p2i
 ni > 0: This condition is positive for small values of ni and
negative for large values of ni. In concrete terms, for ni = 12 ; pi =
1
2 and (12)
reduces to k > 1: However, this condition never holds since k 2 (0; 1): Conse-
quently,
 
kpi + (1  k) p2i
 ni < 0 for ni  12 : Then, since  kpi + (1  k) p2i  
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ni crosses the axis only once and from above, we conclude that condition 
kpi + (1  k) p2i
   ni > 0 can only hold for ni  ni where ni 2  0; 12 : The
particular value ni depends on k: For example, for the particular case of  = 2;
ni =
1
4 and for  = 6; n

i is nearly zero.
In fact, the intersection point ni decreases with k converging to zero as k
increases. See that
@
@
 
k

nki
nki + (1  ni)k

+ (1  k)

nki
nki + (1  ni)k
2
  n
!
? 0 for ni ?
1
2
To show that there is an unique intersection point, check that
@
@ni
 
k

nki
nki + (1  ni)k

+ (1  k)

nki
nki + (1  ni)k
2
  n
!
< 0
The proof is now complete.
Notice that the critical value ni depends also on : Thus, caeteris paribus,
ni decreases as  increases, and the probability of political conict also falls.
Figure 1 shows the conict equilibrium condition, represented by C on the y-
axis, for di¤erent values of :  = 2, [ ];  = 4, [  ];  = 10, [++];  =
100, [:::]. Any region will be willing to initiate political conict if the payo¤ of
doing so is higher than the payo¤ under peace. This corresponds to positive
values of C in gure 1. Thus, gure 1 shows that only small regions will be
likely to initiate political conict. Moreover, the intersection point with the
x-axis (ni ) decreases as  increases, tending rapidly to zero.
In this section we have argued that when regional budgets are used to pro-
vide private and rival public goods (in the extreme case, monetary transfers),
small regions are more inclined to initiate political conict, if we dene the
peaceful agreement as the proportional equalization rule. However, other possi-
ble peaceful agreements could be considered since regional governments are able
to bargain for di¤erent equalization rules using compensating transfers (to the
losers). Regional cooperation is feasible since the sum of the expected payo¤s
under political conict is lower than the payo¤ received under peace
n11

kp1 + (1  k) p21

+ n22

kp2 + (1  k) p22

=
q [2(k   1)p1p2 + 1] < q since (k   1) < 0
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Figure 1: Conict equilibrium condition for di¤erent values of 
3.2 Public regional budgets
Let us suppose that regional budgets are used exclusively to provide pure public
goods. To simplify, consider that to produce one unit of any public good one unit
of the budget is required. We dene the per capita utility derived from the public
good as 
: Thus, the per capita payo¤of imposing regional preferences is dened
as i = 
: The payo¤ corresponding to the peaceful agreement (proportional
rule) is dened as 
ni15 .Thus, using (9) and (11) and simplifying, the condition
for region i initiating conict is,


 
kpi + (1  k) p2i

> 
ni (14)
where
pi =
ni
ni + (1  ni) (15)
Proposition 2 Assume that regional budgets are used to provide pure public
goods, and that under the peaceful agreement, regions have a per capita equal
share of Q. Thus, no region will have an incentive to initiate political conict.
Therefore, the proportional rule would be immune to political conict.
To prove this proposition, see that from (6) we know that r1 = r2. Now,
using (1) we can rewrite pi = sni (i = 1; 2) where s = r1R =
r2
R : Then as
X
i
pi =
1 we obtain that s = 1 and consequently that pi = ni: Finally, substituting pi
15This denition implies that region i does not take into account the positive externalities
derived from the provision of pure public goods in region j: This is equivalent to considering
that the benets obtained from pure public goods are regionally delimited.
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by ni in (14) and simplifying, the equilibrium condition for conict (14) reduces
to ni > 1 which is impossible since by denition ni 2 (0; 1) : This implies
that conict will never occur and therefore the proportional rule is immune to
political conict.
4 Private & public regional budgets
Let us consider now the general case where regional budgets are used to provide
both rival and pure public goods. Thus, the per capita payo¤ of region i; when
it imposes its own preferences, is dened as, i =
h
 qni + (1  )

i
. Where
 2 [0; 1] refers to the proportion of the budget assigned to provide rival public
goods. Thus, (1  ) refers to the proportion of the budget attached to pure
public goods provision or, in other words, the degree of publicness of the budget.
Likewise, the payo¤ corresponding to the peaceful agreement (proportional rule)
is dened as q+(1  ) 
 ni. Thus, using (9) and (11) the condition for region
i initiating conict is

q
ni
+ (1  ) 

 
kpi + (1  k) p2i

> q + (1  ) 
ni (16)
where
p =
ni

 qni
+(1 )

 q1 ni+(1 )

k
ni

 qni
+(1 )

 q1 ni+(1 )

k
+ (1  ni)
(17)
To simplify let us assume  = 2 and q = 
. Then (17) becomes
pi =
ni


ni
+(1 )

1 ni+(1 )
 1
2
ni


ni
+(1 )

1 ni+(1 )
 1
2
+ (1  ni)
(18)
Taking partial derivatives we obtain that @pi@ni > 0: This implies, caeteris
paribus, that more populated regions have higher probability of winning. How-
ever, @pi@ > 0 for ni 2
 
0; 12

and @pi@ < 0 for ni 2
 
1
2 ; 1

: Thus, the winning
probability of small regions increases when the proportion of private goods in
their budget also increases. In contrast, the winning probability of large regions
increases when the proportion of pure public goods increases.
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Proposition 3 Assume that regional budgets are used to provide a combination
of private goods and pure public goods, and that under the peaceful agreement,
regions have a per capita equal share of Q. Thus, for  = 2 and q = 
, there
exists a certain n 2  0; 12 such that regions with a population share ni  nwill
be likely to launch into political conict
The proof of this proposition is as follows. First, see that condition (16)
simplies to
 
kpi + (1  k) p2i
   ni > 0; where pi is dened by (18) : This
condition is positive for small values of ni and negative for large values of ni;
crossing the xaxis only once in the interval ni 2 (0; 1) : For ni = 12 ; pi
 
1
2

= 12
and the equilibrium conict condition,
 
kpi + (1  k) p2i
   ni > 0; becomes
k > 1: Since by denition k 2 (0; 1) this condition never holds and therefore
it should be the case that
 
kpi + (1  k) p2i
   ni < 0: Thus, regions with a
population share ni  12 will not wish to engage in conict. Finally, we conclude
that there must be a value ni 2
 
0; 12

for which
 
kpi + (1  k) p2i
   ni = 0;
and that
 
kpi + (1  k) p2i
   ni < 0 for ni < ni : Consequently, regions with
ni < n

i will have an incentive to initiate conict. For instance, setting  =
1
2 ;
ni = 0; 19:
Condition (16) includes, as particular solutions, the extreme cases of pure
private budgets and pure public budgets.
Setting  = 1 in (18) and substituting pi in (16) we obtain the equilibrium
conict condition for the extreme case of only private goods when  = 2. Thus,
q
ni
  
kpi + (1  k) p2i

> q where pi = ni
1
2
ni
1
2+(1 ni)
1
2
:
Likewise, setting Setting  = 0 in (18) and substituting pi in (16) we obtain
the equilibrium conict condition for the extreme case of a budget devoted solely
to provision of pure public goods when  = 2. Thus, 

 
kpi + (1  k) p2i

> 
ni
where pi = nini+(1 ni)
As in the case of private regional budgets, regions can always agree on di¤er-
ent peaceful equalization rules using suitable compensating transfers. In other
words, regions could always bargain and reach a new agreement since the sum
of the expected payo¤s under political conict is lower than the payo¤ received
under peace
n11

kp1 + (1  k) p21

+ n22

kp2 + (1  k) p22

=
q [a] + (1  )
 [b] < q + (1  )
 since a < 1, b < 1
where [a] = [2(k   1)p1p2 + 1] ; [b] = [(k   2)p1p2 + 1] ; k < 1:
5 Conclusions
We have analysed the political viability of equalization rules using a standard
model of conict, as in Ray (2009). We have shown that the initiation of polit-
ical conict depends on the degree of publicness of the regional budget. When
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regional budgets are used to provide pure public goods, proportional equaliza-
tion is immune to political conict. This implies that full equalization would
be politically feasible in this case. However, no equalization rule is immune to
political conict when regional budgets are used to provide private goods or a
linear combination of pure public goods and private goods. In both these set-
tings there exists a population share ni <
1
2 such that a region with ni < n

i
would be inclined to spend resources on lobbying in order to impose its own pref-
erences on the rest of the country. Consequently, neither partial equalization
nor excessive redistribution would be immune to political conict.
From the analysis, it is clear that small regions are more likely to instigate
political conict when budgets are private. This is because, in this case, they
are more e¤ective relative to their size since per capita payo¤s from conict are
higher the smaller the group. In contrast, when budgets are public, the size of
the group does not matter and the e¤ectiveness advantage of being small disap-
pears. This is why there is less risk of political conict when the publicness of
regional budgets increases. Moreover, we have shown that peaceful agreements,
other than full equalization are feasible through the denition of compensating
transfers.16 In this regard, we should further explore the use of political conict
as a bargaining mechanism to establish new sharing rules as in Powell (2004)
and Wagner (2000).
Empirical evidence from Spain and Germany shows that equalization sys-
tems based on progressive transfers which cause the reranking of regions in
terms of per capita (standard) revenues are not politically stable. Furthermore,
the case of Germany is also an example of the use of transfers as an instrument
to reach peaceful agreements other than full equalization. In concrete terms,
after the judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court (11 November 1999),
the equalization device was reformed establishing a partial equalization system.
Additionally, the eastern Länder were compensated and awarded high Federal
investments until 2019, through the Solidarity Pact II.
Furthermore, the results obtained provide an intuitive argument for decen-
tralizing the provision of public services. The argument would go as follows.
When the degree of publicness of regional budgets is high, it is more e¢ cient
to centralize the provision of public goods in order to take advantage of the
economies of scale. However, when rivalry (congestion) is high, the risk of polit-
ical conict increases in inverse proportion to regional size. Therefore, to reduce
the cost of lobbying, the decentralization of pure public goods is recommended
since they o¤er a lower risk of political conict. We have thus outlined two
operating forces in opposite directions which would dene the optimal size of
the jurisdiction in a similar fashion as in the generalized version of the Oates
theorem of decentralization (1972)17 . We should explore further this argument
16Suitable transfers can be implemented to compensate losers since the addition of "conict
payo¤s" is lower than the payo¤s under the peaceful agreement (see sections 3.1 and 3.3).
Haimanko et al (2005), in a di¤erent setting, also argue for the use of transfers as a mechanism
to resolve conicts.
17Oates (1972), however, does not consider lobbying costs. Instead, he argues that the cost
of belonging to the same group increases with the size of the group (n). Thus, he denes the
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using a theoretical framework as in Desmet et al (2006).
Additional insights might emerge from the introduction of risk aversion in the
maximization problem of regional political leaders. We could do this using the
concept of political bias as in Jackson and Morelli (2006). Thus, the probability
of engaging in political conict would also depend on the private benet (or
cost) that the political party in power would obtain from conict. Finally, we
should explore the political viability of equalization rules taking into account
the possibility that discontented regions threaten secession (see, e.g. Haimanko
et al, 2005; Le Breton and Weber, 2003 a, b).
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